

Web Appendix for “More a Molehill than a Mountain: The Effects of the Blanket Primary on Elected Officials’ Behavior in California”

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The following tables contain supplementary results for the paper “More a Molehill than a Mountain: The Effects of the Blanket Primary on Elected Officials’ Behavior in California.” The data and code required to reproduce the results, figures and tables can be found at: <http://people.vanderbilt.edu/~josh.clinton/> or www.princeton.edu/~wbullock/blanket_primary.

1 Supplementary Results: Replacement Effects

Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the replacements compared in section 2 of the paper. There are no statistically significance differences, but there is modestly more moderation among outgoing representatives in California than outgoing representatives from districts in other states (two-sided p-value of .14).

Table 2 reports the results for the replacement effects in California Assembly. The regression specification is analogous to the results reported in Model 2 in Table 2 in the paper. *Centrist District* is measured in Model 2A using the proportion of voters in the district who are not registered with the incumbent’s party and who are therefore newly eligible to vote in blanket primary. This is the proportion is graphed in Figure 1 in the paper. Given the relationship evidence in Figure 1 in the paper between *District Extremity* – which uses the two party vote share of the vote for Democrat candidate Al Gore in the 2000 election – and the percentage of voters who are not registered with the incumbent’s party, Model 2A in Table 2 reveals that including both controls produces very imprecise estimates. (In fact, one cannot reject the null on the joint F-test that all coefficients in Model 2A are jointly zero.) Model 2C estimates the relationship in the California Assembly using a *Centrist District* indicator for whether more than 45% of the registered voters are unaffiliated with the incumbent’s party.

Table 3 reports the matching estimates for the conversion effects graphed in Figure 4 in the paper.

2 Supplementary Results: Conversion Effects

Table 4 provides the summary statistics of the replacements compared in section 4 of the paper. The differences suggest the importance of accounting for possible covariate differences when assessing the evidence for possible conversion effects.

Table 5 presents the robustness of the results of Models 3 and 4 in Table 3 in the text when using only those votes that the *National Journal* identifies as being particularly important.

Models 3B and 3C in Table 6 provide the analogous specification to Model 3 used to analyze conversion in the U.S. House to examine possible conversion effects in the California Assembly. Model 3B measures *Centrist District* using the proportion of registered voters who are not registered with the party of the incumbent and Model 3C follows Table 2 and uses an indicator for whether more than 45% of the registered voters register either as an independent or with a party different than that of the incumbent.

3 Robustness of the “Centrist District” Measure

To ensure the robustness of the results to alternative measures of what represents a “centrist” (or “less partisan”) district, we replicate all of the analysis in two ways. First, we use an alternative threshold for defining “centrist” districts. Second, we shift our attention to looking at whether there is more moderation in extreme districts than centrist districts (as some might suspect) to distinguish the districts using a third classification scheme.

Utilizing an alternative threshold to determine which districts are more centrist than others fails to change the substantive results. Table 7 reports the coefficient of “Centrist District” using the proximity of the two-party presidential vote share in the district to 50% rather than the national average for each of the models reported in the paper. Specifically, the measure of *Centrist District* used in the results reported below indicates whether the two-party presidential vote for the Bill Clinton (D) in the 1996 Presidential election is within

5% of 50% in the district – i.e., districts with two-party presidential votes between 45% and 55%. The resulting coefficient estimates in Models 2R, 3R, 4R, 5R and 6R are substantively identical to the effects reported in Models 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 in the text.

A second possible measure is instead of using a measure based on voting behavior in all elections (as in the text), or in one particular election (as in Table 7), is to use a centrism measure based on the last presidential election that was held. Table 8 reveals that the Conversion results are robust – if not slightly stronger statistically – in terms of the relationship between centrist districts and moderation than the results in Table 7.

An alternative perspective on the results is to question whether there is more or less moderation in extreme districts. There is obviously a close relationship between the set of centrist and extreme districts – the two sets of districts are almost complements of one another. The primary difference in the analysis is the interpretation of the main effect for the indicator variable *California District*. To identify extreme districts we use the two-party vote for Bill Clinton (D) in the 1996 presidential election in the district and we identify those districts that cast more than 60% of the vote for either Bill Clinton or the Republican Robert Dole. Table 9 reports the results.

Contrary to the possibility that the most partisan districts experience the most moderation because of the largest number of crossover voters, the results in Table 9 show that incumbents from such districts, if anything, became more extreme following the adoption of the blanket primary. Although imprecisely estimated, the coefficient for the interaction of $CA \times \textit{Extreme District}$ in Models 3E, 4E and 5E indicates that there is less, rather than more, moderation in extreme districts. (In fact, the interaction in Model 3E is significant at a two-sided p-value of .12.) Only in the placebo test comparing behavior prior to the adoption of the blanket primary (Model 6R) is there evidence of moderation in extreme districts, and such moderation cannot be attributable to the blanket primary because the primary had not yet been approved.

Variable	Non-California Districts	California Districts	Difference
Moderation (Stnd Err.)	1.72 (13.46)	52.00 (21.89)	50.28 (33.88)
Centrist District Indicator	.52 (.09)	.20 (.20)	-.32 (.24)
Ideological Extremity	.97 (.08)	1.22 (.13)	.25 (.20)
District Extremity	10.60 (1.94)	11.60 (5.11)	.99 (5.12)
Democrat Indicator	.52 (.09)	.80 (.20)	.28 (.24)
Sample Size	29	5	

Table 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAME-PARTY REPLACEMENTS IN THE U.S. HOUSE, 1997-2000. Standard deviations reported for the variables, standard errors are reported for the differences. * indicates a statistically significance difference in the two samples using a two-sided significance test of .10 or better.

Variable	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 2C
Constant (Stnd Err.)	-18.93 (14.56)	-35.06 (25.47)	-21.51* (9.00)
Centrist District	7.95 (20.75)	38.19 (44.25)	8.56 (6.70)
Ideological Extremity	12.63 (7.63)	10.24 (8.29)	9.14 (8.22)
Democrat Indicator	8.93* (4.73)	8.05 (4.90)	6.98 (4.90)
District Extremity		32.13 (41.43)	32.17 (31.30)
R ²	.30	.31	.34
N	29	29	29

Table 2: SAME PARTY REPLACEMENT EFFECTS IN THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, 1997-2000. * indicates two-sided significance at .10 or better.

Sample	Pre	Post	Sample Size	ATE	ATT
Less Partisan	104th House	105th House	150	24.72* (8.38)	11.74 (10.29)
More Partisan	104th House	105th House	151	-7.05 (5.68)	-7.01 (5.88)
Less Partisan	104th House	106th House	127	29.24 (18.54)	25.27 (19.78)
More Partisan	104th House	106th House	135	-15.55 (9.73)	-6.37 (8.00)
Less Partisan	106th House	107th House	164	1.47 (7.43)	4.82 (7.42)
More Partisan	106th House	107th House	167	1.79 (7.38)	3.74 (7.66)
Less Partisan	103rd House	104th House	140	-23.07* (7.84)	-29.66* (8.40)
More Partisan	103rd House	104thHouse	152	-.70 (7.47)	1.82 (8.37)

Table 3: MATCHING ESTIMATES FOR FIGURE 4: Estimates using nearest-neighbor matching with bias correction. Standard errors are in parentheses and * indicates a statistically significance difference in the two samples using a two-sided significance test of .10 or better.

Variable	Non-California Districts	California Districts	Difference
Moderation (Std Err.)	1.25 (1.88)	5.17 (4.57)	3.92 (4.80)
Centrist District Indicator	.53 (.03)	.32 (.07)	-.21* (.08)
Ideological Extremity	.89 (.02)	1.13 (.06)	.24* (.06)
District Extremity	9.24 (.53)	12.68 (1.31)	3.44* (1.35)
Democrat Indicator	.47 (.03)	.53 (.07)	.06 (.08)
Sample Size	254	47	

Table 4: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONVERSION SAMPLE IN THE 104TH TO 105TH U.S. HOUSES. Standard errors are reported for the differences. * indicates a statistically significance difference in the two samples using a two-sided significance test of .10 or better.

	Model 3A	Model 4A
	Pre: 104 Post: 105	Pre: 104 Post: 106
Constant (Robust Stnd Err.)	-10.29* (4.00)	-21.18* (5.95)
CA District Indicator	-3.41 (5.16)	-9.09 (7.52)
CA × Centrist District	11.89 (11.41)	42.63* (16.55)
Centrist District Indicator	3.99 (3.88)	1.45 (4.91)
Ideological Extremity	11.28* (3.05)	16.97* (4.43)
Democrat Indicator	1.11 (3.63)	9.48* (4.47)
R ²	.04	.09
N	301	262

Table 5: CONVERSION EFFECTS OF THE BLANKET PRIMARY IN THE U.S. HOUSE: *National Journal* VOTES. * indicates two-sided significance at .10 or better.

	Model 3B	Model 3C
	Pre: 104 Post: 105	Pre: 104 Post: 105
Constant (Stnd Err.)	-4.91 (16.44)	-1.24 (6.28)
Centrist District	1.06 (23.20)	-4.40 (3.87)
Ideological Extremity	3.60 (5.73)	2.24 (4.58)
Democrat Indicator	-3.39 (3.27)	-5.57 (3.04)
R ²	.07	.12
N	32	32

Table 6: CONVERSION EFFECTS OF THE BLANKET PRIMARY IN THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, 1994-1995 TERM VS. 1996-1997 TERM. * indicates two-sided significance at .10 or better.

	Model 2R	Model 3R Pre: 104 Post: 105	Model 4R Pre: 104 Post: 106	Model 5R Pre: 106 Post: 107	Model 6R Pre: 103 Post: 104
CA District (Rbst. Std. Err.)	11.02 (25.91)	-6.22 (4.31)	-5.26 (6.20)	2.21 (6.25)	-2.48 (5.54)
CA × Centrist District		26.10* (13.15)	34.17 (22.03)	-3.45 (8.78)	-27.00* (11.85)
Centrist District Indicator	68.29* (17.29)	.78 (4.01)	-.71 (5.39)	.53 (4.23)	-.51 (5.10)
R ²	.65	.05	.07	.05	.34
N	34	301	262	331	292

Table 7: ROBUSTNESS OF CENTRISM EFFECTS: The measure of *Centrist District Indicator* is based on whether the percent two-party presidential vote for Bill Clinton (D) in the 1996 election is $50\% \pm 5\%$. * indicates two-sided significance at .10 or better. The interaction in Model 4R is significant at a two-sided level of .12.

	Model 3R.2 Pre: 104 Post: 105	Model 4R.2 Pre: 104 Post: 106	Model 5R.2 Pre: 106 Post: 107	Model 6R.2 Pre: 103 Post: 104
CA District (Rbst. Std. Err.)	-6.54 (7.43)	-7.68 (6.20)	2.21 (6.25)	-4.82 (5.81)
CA × Centrist District	24.06* (13.15)	37.68* (16.27)	-3.45 (8.78)	-43.60* (10.16)
Centrist District Indicator	.159 (3.83)	.23 (5.29)	.53 (4.23)	6.69 (4.75)
R ²	.05	.08	.05	.36
N	301	262	331	292

Table 8: ROBUSTNESS OF CENTRISM EFFECTS ON CONVERSION: The measure of *Centrist District Indicator* is based on whether the percent two-party presidential in the prior or contemporaneous election for the Democrat is $50\% \pm 5\%$. * indicates two-sided significance at .10 or better.

	Model 2E	Model 3E	Model 4E	Model 5R	Model 6R
		Pre: 104 Post: 105	Pre: 104 Post: 106	Pre: 106 Post: 107	Pre: 103 Post: 104
CA District (Rbst. Std. Err.)	29.63 (22.25)	8.81 (7.79)	12.31 (12.36)	5.86 (5.67)	-20.51* (8.19)
CA × Extreme District		-15.17 (9.68)	-18.64 (14.54)	-11.47 (9.75)	20.83* (10.17)
Extreme District Indicator	-52.99* (25.97)	-5.53 (3.89)	-1.03 (5.09)	4.70 (4.32)	-.44 (5.79)
R ²	.60	.04	.06	.06	.34
N	34	301	262	331	292

Table 9: ROBUSTNESS OF CENTRISM EFFECTS: “Extreme Districts” identify districts where the a two-party presidential vote for one candidate exceeds 60% in the 1996 election. * indicates two-sided significance at .10 or better.